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Abstract 
Most scholarship on far-right parties focuses on populism while largely ignoring 
the role of intellectualism. Disregarding the increasing support by well-educated 
voters, much of this literature appears to presume that populism and intellectualism 
in the far-right are separate rather than complementary phenomena. Against this 
view, this article uses Skinner’s concept of ‘innovating ideologists’ to explore the 
role of Heideggerian philosophy in the interplay between German New Right 
(GNR) intellectualism and Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) populism. To do so, 
Heidegger’s conception of ‘people’ is outlined before turning to the GNR’s use of 
these concepts in articles, books and speeches, by both GNR intellectuals and 
leading AfD members. The analysis shows that GNR and AfD actors refer to 
Heideggerian philosophy both in the context of intellectual circles and to wider 
audiences to legitimise an exclusive idea of nationhood based not on the illicit idea 
of race but on a more acceptable idea of history. The findings suggest that 
intellectualism and populism in the German far-right are closely connected. The 
article concludes that neglecting GNR intellectualism means underestimating the 
GNR’s and AfD’s capacity to bring about social change. 
Keywords: Germany; New Right; Heidegger; Nationalism; Populism; Intellectuals; 
AfD 
Introduction  
Since far- and radical-right parties had their first electoral successes in Europe in the 
1980s, the literature on them has burgeoned. With the rise of the Front National in France 
and more recently the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) in Germany, the amount of 
academic research has further increased, lately focusing on far-right populism.1 While 
many scholars of what today is commonly called the ‘populist far/radical right’ have 
examined socio-economic and political demand-side factors,2 those looking at the supply 
side and far-right ideology3 have largely ignored the role of intellectualism. Populism is 
mainly conceptualised as a ‘thin ideology’4 that does not ‘possess the same level of 
intellectual refinement and consistency as “thick” or “full” ideologies’ and is centred on 
the opposition of a ‘pure people’ against a ‘corrupt elite’.5 On this basis, the AfD has 
been described as a populist anti-elitist far-right party.6 I do not contest this ideational 
conceptualisation of populism. Rather, I argue that the emphasis on the populist element 
has led to a neglect of the role of intellectual elites inside the ‘populist far/radical right’. 
Implicit in much of the literature is the assumption that intellectualism is separate from 
and not complementary to far-right populism. Focusing on the contemporary German 
New Right (GNR), I aim to show how intellectualism and populism are intertwined and 
argue against the widespread view that ‘simplistic populism’ and ‘complex philosophy’ 
are separate or even antagonistic phenomena. To do so, I draw on six months of research 
in the GNR7 and analyse textual evidence of the use of Heideggerian philosophy by GNR 
intellectuals, AfD politicians and social movements to frame and legitimise their political 
language. 
The focus will be on how Heidegger’s notions of nation and Volk (people) form a 
resource for a rethinking of German nationhood that, in turn, forms an integrative 
conceptual basis for GNR civil society networks linking ‘populist’ and ‘intellectual’ 
political actors. Drawing on Skinner’s concept of ‘innovating ideologists’,8 I will argue 
that GNR intellectuals use Heidegger’s vernacular terminology to legitimise an exclusive 
nationalism9 based not on the illicit idea of race but on history. (Re)conceptualising an 
exclusive nationalism in such a way may allow them to appeal to greater audiences and 
intellectual circles alike. The focus on Heidegger is not to suggest that he is the only 
ideological resource, but that he is one central one. Equally, the aim of this paper is not to 
verify whether the GNR and AfD use Heidegger correctly but to examine why 
philosophy plays a role at all in a ‘populist milieu’, and why Heidegger specifically. 
Section 1 therefore defines the GNR and discusses the place of philosophy in the 
literature on the far/radical right. Quentin Skinner’s concept of ‘innovating ideologists’ is 
introduced to frame the subsequent analysis of GNR intellectual discourse. Instead of 
positioning the ‘intellectual’ GNR against and the ‘populist’ far-right AfD, the GNR is 
conceptualised as a civil society network including the AfD. Here forms of nationalism 
may be elaborated in close interactions between intellectuals, AfD and street movements 
transcending the populism–intellectualism divide. Section 2 discusses Heidegger’s 
philosophy, exposing the parts that lend themselves to appropriation by the GNR. 
Heidegger’s notions of nation and Volk will be sketched out. Special focus will be put on 
his concept of Dasein, the role of history, care and being-towards-death in the 
constitution of a Volk, and ‘technocratic modernity’ (Gestell) as a ‘threatening other’ to 
the authentic Dasein of a Volk.10 Focusing on GNR hubs in Schnellroda, Dresden and 
Berlin, the last two sections examine the use of Heidegger’s concepts in articles, speeches 
and statements by GNR intellectuals, activists and AfD politicians since the climax of the 
so-called PEGIDA protests in 2015.11 
1. The New Right, intellectuals and philosophy 
The German New Right as a civil society network 
The emergence of the GNR can be traced back to the 1960s.12 As a new right it attempted 
to dissociate itself from an old right largely associated with National Socialism (NS). 
Except for some electoral success of parties close to the GNR in the 1980s and 1990s and 
a series of publications that reached a broader audience after reunification,13 the impact of 
the GNR has remained rather limited.14 In his analysis of the GNR in the 1990s Jan-
Werner Müller sees the main reasons for the GNR’s failure in a lack of ideological 
innovation, institutional support and its inability to dissociate itself from the old right 
while keeping the distance to the conservative CDU.15 However, since the foundation of 
the AfD and the so-called refugee crisis in 2015, GNR output has increased, an 
institutional infrastructure has emerged, and its ideology been updated. Alongside 
‘veterans’ of the GNR, new central actors have emerged, including former 
representatives of established parties and media.  
I define the GNR as a network at the conjunction of conservatism and right 
extremism,16 opposing the idea that there are two distinct types of far-right politics: 
‘narrow-minded party politics’ and an ‘intellectually free-floating phenomenon detached 
from pragmatic political concerns’.17 Instead, I see large parts of the AfD as important 
actors in a GNR civil society network—a communicative space in which illiberal and 
nationalist ideas are elaborated and thrive.18 This network mirrors the two wings that can 
roughly be discerned inside the AfD: an ordoliberal one focusing on economic national 
interests and a national conservative one focusing on the reassertion of a national 
culture.19 Despite political differences, they share a nationalist focus, and the boundaries 
between the camps are often fluid.  
The GNR network is carried by think tanks (Institut für Staatspolitik (IfS), 
Bibliothek des Konservatismus (BdK)), publishing houses (Antaios, Manufactum), social 
movements (PEGIDA in Dresden, Zukunft Heimat in Cottbus, Frauenmarsch in Berlin), 
youth organisations (Identitarian Movement), journalists, politicians and intellectuals. 
Besides the think tanks, important forums of exchange are a plethora of more established 
and new press publications almost exclusively aimed at an intellectual audience. The IfS 
and Antaios are led by Götz Kubitschek, probably the most visible figure in the 
contemporary GNR. Seated in a medieval mansion in the tiny eastern German village of 
Schnellroda, they represent an alternative nationalism focusing on Heimat (homeland) 
and nature, mingling intellectualism with street activism and close links to the 
Identitarian Movement. With its isolated headquarters, it underlines its distance from 
party politics and its intellectual independence. Their bi-monthly Sezession has been 
published since 2003 and, together with its blog version, has developed into a central 
GNR publication. Tichys Einblick, on the other hand, represents the more moderate, 
ordoliberal faction of the AfD and emerged in 2016 out of an internet blog by a former 
Focus journalist. Tumult started as a far-left publication in the late 1970s and was 
relaunched in 2013. It reaches mainly an academic audience and is published in Dresden, 
a city that has developed into another central GNR hub. Another increasingly influential 
magazine is CATO, published since 2017 under the influence of GNR veteran Karl-Heinz 
Weiβmann and the BdK. Seated in the bourgeois Berlin neighbourhood of 
Charlottenburg, BdK and CATO embody a GNR rooted mainly in a western German 
tradition, not as distant from Germany’s political institutions as the IfS or Tumult. As 
such, it is close to the equally Berlin-based newspaper Junge Freiheit and its editor 
Dieter Stein. Established in 1996, it is aimed at a broader audience.  
Besides these print products, blogs are increasingly popular among an intellectual 
readership. Michael Klonovsky’s (also a former Focus journalist) blog Acta Diurna, 
David Berger’s (former editor-in-chief of the gay periodical MÄNNER) Philosophia 
Perennis and Vera Lengsfeld’s (CDU20 politician) Achse des Guten are only some of the 
most important blogs. Epoch Times and PI News are equally recent ‘alternative’ online 
media but are aimed at a more popular audience. An interesting case is Compact. 
Founded by the former far-left Jürgen Elsässer, it is present at all PEGIDA 
demonstrations and has a strong presence on- and offline. Its articles range from populist 
news to interviews and articles with and on intellectuals.  
These are only some of the central actors and platforms in a constantly growing 
network, equally carried by a large number of social media accounts, social activism and 
festivals such as the Kyffhäuser and Wartburg Festivals. Common actions between the 
different actors are often organised and financed by the network Ein Prozent founded by 
Kubitschek and Elsässer. This nationwide network is complemented by local private 
salons where GNR protagonists present and discuss their newest publications. 
Overall, it is not an exaggeration to say that the GNR has established an 
alternative civil society network21 with its own public sphere that is increasingly visible, 
not only through new publications but also in a surge of activism. Schnellroda, Berlin and 
Dresden can be seen as central hubs of exchange between street activists, intellectuals, 
AfD politicians and different factions of GNR nationalism. Even if these publications 
cover different GNR currents, the networks between them are dense, and authors write 
interchangeably for them. What unites these different groups is the conviction that 
German culture is in a decline reversible only through a national reassertion against a 
Holocaust-related culture of guilt,22 Islam and immigration,23 neglect of Germany’s own 
culture,24 moral universalism25 or the EU.26 
Philosophy, intellectuals and populism in the GNR 
Despite these links, intellectualism and philosophy play a marginal role in the populist 
far-right literature. Arguably, this is partly because much of the current research draws its 
insights from party manifestos or speeches given by prominent party members. Less in 
focus is GNR intellectualism as a potential factor in the increased acceptance of populist 
far-right ideology by the mainstream. The GNR is mainly regarded as a separate cultural 
phenomenon27 whose influence on populist far-right parties is doubted.28 In the case of 
Germany, this separation can be challenged for two reasons. 
First, on the supply side, the national-conservative AfD wing has gained 
importance since the party’s foundation in 2013. National-conservative AfD members far 
outnumber more moderate members in the German parliament.29 The AfD has developed 
from a party with an economic ordoliberal focus into an increasingly nationalistic party.30 
Even if political differences persist, the common ground is a nationalist framing of 
politics as well as an attempt to redefine German identity in an overtly nationalist way. 
This redefinition relies on intellectual concepts and an alternative political language. As a 
consequence, strong links between the ‘populist’ AfD and the ‘intellectual’ GNR have 
developed. Many AfD politicians are guests at GNR events while some GNR 
intellectuals are party members and/or regularly present at party meetings. Central here 
are the BdK and the IfS, the latter of which has spread its influence into the core of 
German democracy. In June 2018, the IfS had its first appearance in the buildings of the 
Bundestag with a presentation of the IfS’s ‘scientific director’ Erik Lehnert.31 Like many 
authors and protagonists of the IfS, the BdK, Tumult or CATO, Lehnert is a parliamentary 
assistant for an AfD MP. Equally, Ein Prozent recently held its first workshop in the 
Bundestag upon invitation by the AfD.32 The most influential intellectual expression of 
support of core AfD but also PEGIDA claims so far has been the Erklärung 2018  signed 
by a wide range of old and new GNR protagonists.33 A look at the names on the petition 
shows the width of the GNR coalition bringing together GNR (Karl-Heinz Weiβmann, 
Dieter Stein) and former New Left intellectuals (Frank Böckelmann, Henryk M. Broder) 
as well as former representatives of established media and parties (Matthias Matussek, 
Eva Herman, Vera Lengsfeld, Thilo Sarazzin). Equally important is the fact that the AfD 
now officially allows its members to cooperate with PEGIDA34 and is openly present at 
demonstrations in Dresden and other cities. AfD’s reach into civil society is further 
institutionalised by the Desiderius-Erasmus-Stiftung, recently confirmed as the official 
party foundation. Its aim is to break the dominating ‘leftist ideology’ through a ‘cultural 
revolution’.35 The board of trustees is made up of a variety of cultural and academic 
actors, including central GNR figures such as Karl-Heinz Weiβmann and David Berger 
(see above).  
A second reason lies on the demand side. The AfD appeals to well-educated 
voters who, at least in part, can be considered local and national cultural elites, often with 
rather well-off middle-class backgrounds.36 This holds equally true for such social 
movements as PEGIDA.37 Contrary to what the term ‘populism’ suggests, AfD voters are 
not exclusively a group of uneducated voters left behind, rising against elites and looking 
for easy answers. At least in the case of Germany, a rigid separation between ‘far-right 
populism’ and ‘GNR intellectualism’ thus seems difficult to uphold and more reflects 
methodological convenience than reality.  
GNR intellectuals as ‘innovating ideologists’ 
The common perception of populism and intellectualism as antagonistic can be 
interpreted as a vision of politics that, according to Skinner, dismisses the role of 
‘professed ideals’ (such as ‘people’ or ‘nation’) as ‘ex post facto rationalisations’ for 
actions of ‘dubious characters’ that need to be treated with suspicion. According to this 
view, such ideals can be dismissed in the analysis of political actors’ behaviour as they 
‘play no causal role in bringing about their actions, and do not therefore need to figure in 
our explanations of their behaviour’.38 As a consequence, any reference to these 
principles is dismissed. A similar vision of politics underpins much of the populism 
literature that claims that any reference to the people is purely strategic or stylistic.39 
Skinner opposes this vision of politics. He argues that, even if principles rarely function 
as direct motives for political actors, they nevertheless make a difference in their 
behaviour, namely when a political agent acts in a way that is ‘socially questionable’ and 
possesses at the same time ‘a strong motive for attempting … to legitimize it’.40 The 
‘rhetorical trick’ in this process of legitimisation in a ‘hostile’ socio-lingual context 
consists of attributing a generally acceptable moral vocabulary to a ‘questionable social 
behaviour’.  
With Skinner I conceptualise GNR intellectuals as ‘innovating ideologists’ whose 
defining task is to legitimise socially questionable behaviour.41 Their role is central as 
they develop, spread and employ a political language that links (populist) political 
practice to political theory and puts both into a mutually influencing relationship. In the 
case of the GNR, populist political practice is increasingly embedded in and legitimised 
by a political language elaborated by intellectuals.  
As the political vocabulary of a community,42 a political language is central to 
both the constitution and the legitimisation of social practice. A theoretical change in the 
vocabulary of a community will subsequently also change the social reality, the political 
institutions as well as the political practices.43 Political intellectuals can contribute to the 
altering and subverting of the dominant political language and ‘communities of 
assumption’44 in such a way that the political reality they support appears as rational and 
legitimate.45 For the elaboration and spread of political language an exchange between 
intellectual ‘elites’ and ‘the people’ is central. Geiger defines intellectuals as ‘creators of 
representative culture’: artists, poets, writers, composers, scientists, inventors but also 
journalists and Volksredner (popular speakers). What is essential to qualify as an 
intellectual is not the degree of intellectual abstraction but the communicating 
intelligence and capacity to create new cultural values. Indispensable is the ‘creation of 
culture’ through ‘a special system of development in a popular form’ (my emphasis).46 
Political language is not excluded from this process. 
But what exactly is the ‘questionable social behaviour’ or political language GNR 
intellectuals aim to legitimise? What is central to the post-war far-right is ‘nationalism’.47 
Nationalism is a ‘thin-centred ideology’ engaged in a power struggle over the ‘selection, 
prioritization and combination of certain political concepts and the elimination of others’ 
that, in order to become a full ideology, has to be complemented by other idea-systems 
such as the far-right ideology.48 Far-right nationalism ‘presupposes that the nation-state 
is the necessary and natural form of society’.49 In the far-right, populism is combined 
with nationalism in that the ‘pure people’ is conceived as the imagined community of the 
nation.50 However, this ‘national people’ is not necessarily opposed to any elite. Rather it 
is opposed to ‘a current and illegitimate’ elite that is seen as not representing the people 
or the nation.51 In the case of the German far-right, the questionable nationalism is not 
nationalism per se.52 Instead, the far-right’s ‘socially questionable’ nationalism is an 
‘illicit nationalism’53 reminiscent of Nazism through its exclusive ethnic understanding of 
nationhood. It is this exclusive priority of the nation54 that the GNR aims to legitimise in 
a context were nationalism is largely perceived as ‘illicit’.  
In what follows, the way Heidegger’s philosophy is used as a resource in this 
process is analysed. Instead of falling into the established categories of ethnic and civic 
nationalism,55 the GNR puts forward an alternative Heidegger-inspired nationalism 
grounded in history and spirit56. It does not represent a sui generis nationalism but draws 
on narratives of German nationhood present in Heidegger’s philosophy and early German 
anti-enlightenment nationalism, such as in Herder57 or Hegel.58 In this tradition, 
Heidegger’s Dasein is used to reformulate an exclusive idea of nationhood in the context 
of a liberal democratic political language in which closeness to NS, racist nationalism and 
anti-Semitism are socially questionable and legally banned.59  
2. Heidegger’s nation and Volk  
The following section focuses on Heidegger’s notions of nation and Volk (people) before 
turning to GNR authors and the AfD. It will necessarily be a limited discussion restricted 
to sketching out those Heideggerian terms and concepts that lend themselves to a GNR 
use.60  
Heidegger’s closeness to NS and his anti-Semitism61 have been subject to intense 
debates and have polarised scholarship into two rough camps: those who see Heidegger 
as the Nazi philosopher or his philosophy as contaminated by Nazism,62 and those who 
underline the value of Heidegger’s philosophy independently of his Nazism.63 Regardless 
of this ongoing debate, the appeal of Heidegger’s philosophy to the contemporary far-
right cannot be denied. Its far-right potential was explored only recently by Beiner, who 
has shown how the far-right appropriates Heideggerian philosophy as a sort of 
‘Heideggerian Neofascism’.64 Heidegger’s anti-liberalism and conviction that cultural 
decline and nihilistic modernity could be overcome by a fundamental rethinking of being 
under the ‘guidance of German hyper-nationalism’65 provides a useful intellectual 
resource for the GNR. His intellectual attraction towards a ‘collective myth of socio-
cultural decline and renewal’66 is equally at the core67 of the GNR and provides a 
common ground for actors from the far-right to conservatives.  
Moreover, Heidegger’s vision of intellectualism chimes with the GNR. He sees 
true intellectuals as ‘closer to being’ than ‘ordinary intellectuals’.68 These ‘future ones’,69 
creators and deciders, include those statesmen, thinkers and artists with the spiritual 
access to the mystery of being he sees necessary to overcome modern nihilism.70 He 
perceives them, and himself, at the same level as peasants and soldiers, both of which he 
equally believes to have a direct access to being.71 Here Heidegger’s philosophy has a 
populist dimension, idealising the ‘common folk’ and fascinated with mass movements.72  
Despite this affinity, Heidegger’s philosophy plays only a minor role in the 
literature on far-right populism and/or the GNR, which mainly considers thinkers of the 
so-called ‘Conservative Revolution’ (CR),73 such as Spengler or Schmitt.74 While it is 
true that a large number of intellectuals have been influential on the GNR, Heidegger’s 
role as a resource for contemporary NR thought remains under-researched. Analyses 
remain limited to GNR authors,75 activist and journalistic sources.76 Central to this 
analysis is therefore the question of what role philosophy in general and Heidegger in 
particular plays in GNR nationalism and why? Exploring this may show how the GNR 
attempts to ‘override’77 the social and legal constraints of the German post-war political 
system78 and how far this ideological positioning can explain the current appeal of GNR 
thoughts. 
Dasein and Volk  
Dasein literally translates as ‘being-there’. In Heidegger’s seminal 1927 work Being and 
Time,79 Dasein is the central concept of his philosophy of being. For Heidegger, the 
‘there’ of Dasein constitutes a particular local form of universal human ‘being’.80 As 
human beings we are thrown into a specific ‘there’ at birth. This ‘there’ is defined first 
and foremost temporally81 and characterised by four dimensions: (1) our own being-
towards-death, the resulting (2) care about our individual lives, (3) the history into which 
we are born, and (4) our being-with-others. 
The first two dimensions define our individual Dasein in a non-relational way.82 
Individual birth and death, the two poles in between which Dasein unfolds, particularise 
universal human being. While we are in the world with others, we are with ourselves only 
in death. In the face of non-relational death, we become aware of our particular Dasein. 
This makes us care about the way in which we choose to be-towards-death, our life 
project. Through this caring, things matter to us.83 Dasein becomes authentic and 
manifest without retreating into the banal everyday life Heidegger associates with 
modern society.84 In this society, authentic Dasein has to be realised against the ‘they’ 
(Man), or, in other words, the mass of the people who ‘do things’ in an average way. 
Here, authentic Dasein is threatened by the ‘other’ of the ‘they’.85 It is authentic in its 
being-towards-death as it faces us with nothingness, makes us step out of the average 
understanding of the ‘they’ and realise our singular existence. Through this existentialist 
dimension, Heidegger hopes to overcome Seinsvergessenheit, the forgetfulness of being 
he sees in modernity.  
The other two dimensions through which human being is individuated and takes 
the shape of an authentic Dasein are history and being-with-others.86 Both are 
relational:87 being thrown into a particular historical ‘there’, we become part of a history 
and tradition that preceded us. Finally, individual Dasein is defined by its embeddedness 
in a being-with-others. It is here where Heidegger’s concept of Dasein opens itself up for 
holistic interpretations.88 Dasein can only be understood in relation to the group one is 
part of. The ‘there’ of our Dasein is essentially a being-with-others, one’s 
contemporaries. With them, the ‘we’ stands in a certain history that is understood as ‘our’ 
past, present and future. Besides space and time, it is these contemporaries who make the 
‘there’ of Dasein specific. The historising of Dasein is for Heidegger a ‘co-historizing’.89 
Heidegger explicates a communitarian understanding of Dasein substantially only in the 
1930s, but it is already visible in Being and Time: 
If fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with Others, its 
historizing is a co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny. This is how we 
designate the historizing of the community of a people [Volksgemeinschaft] (…). 
Dasein’s fateful destiny in and with its “generation” goes to make up the full 
authentic historizing of Dasein.90  
In their relational dimension, history and being-with-others are necessary for 
authentic Dasein91 as ‘Man as historical … exists in the togetherness of a historical 
people’.92 In Dasein, both individual and collective being are intertwined in multiplicity93 
as authentic individual Dasein depends on its relation to the collective Dasein of a Volk.94 
This thought forms the foundation for Heidegger’s later fervent support of NS.95 
As he argues in his 1933 Freiburg seminars, ‘the destiny of a people has to be understood 
in distinctively historical terms’.96 Contrary to Nazism, he thus defines German 
nationhood not in racial terms97 but adheres to a ‘spiritual racism’ that defines national 
Dasein through its particular history.98  
Heidegger further exposes his concept of the Volk in his 1934 lectures ‘Logic as 
the Question Concerning the Essence of Language’. Defining for the Dasein of a Volk is 
the question of ‘who are we ourselves?’. Asking this question, he argues, is timely as the 
question itself would be different from the central question of liberalism: ‘who am I 
myself?’.99 By asking the ‘we-question’ a ‘we’ is presupposed whose essence Heidegger 
sees defined by the Dasein as a Volk. The Dasein of a Volk is grounded in a history 
defined by the decision to be a Volk and manifested and formed politically in the figure of 
the state.100 By acting determinately together as a Volk, the ‘we’ draws on a common 
mandate derived from the past ‘beenness’ and tradition of the Volk. This tradition is 
handed down onto the ‘we’ in the present to ‘labour’ for a collective mission in the 
future.101 Here, the Volk, as a whole, cares about its being in the future. Through 
labouring as a Volk in the here and now, history is made, the Dasein of the Volk re-
realised and manifested.  
This man-made temporality of Volk and Dasein is a human phenomenon which 
goes, as Heidegger claims, beyond the modern distinction between subject and object, 
individual and society. The subject and the object have an ontic relationship in Dasein 
overlooked by the shallowness of modern thinking,102 where the external world is 
perceived as present-at-hand, as objectively alterable by mankind—a thinking Heidegger 
sees at the origin of technology and liberalism.103  
While it is a matter of debate whether Being and Time is essentially political104 or 
apolitical,105 his 1930s lectures explicitly reject modernity and liberalism. Both, he 
argues, undermine the essence of Dasein through the detachment from traditional bonds, 
community, dogmas and nature.106 For a ‘genuine revolution of the whole of being’ 
liberalism and its ‘shallow’ conception of being has to be fought.107 For Heidegger, there 
cannot be a society emerging out of a rational association of individuals but only a 
community of a Volk based on a historically handed-down determination to act together 
and to care about one’s own existence. Through caring in the face of decline, the Volk 
continues to be a category of authentic Dasein and the defining principle of the selfhood 
of human being.108 Through its existentialism, Dasein is authentic and becomes an 
‘insurrection against nothingness’,109 the same nothingness many CR thinkers saw in 
modern liberal society and that still builds the basis of unease with modernity present in 
the contemporary GNR. 
Universalism and Gestell  
Through his shift of focus to the collective level of Dasein110 Heidegger moves the idea 
of the ‘they’ from the societal to the inter- or transnational level that takes the shape of a 
menacing ‘uniform organization of reified humanity’.111 The ‘other’ is what threatens the 
Dasein of a Volk—universalism and a technological understanding of the world. 
In the 1930s, Heidegger sees this threat in American capitalism and 
Russian/Asian communism both menacing Germany, the ‘most metaphysical of 
nations’.112 For Heidegger, ‘Russia and America are the same; the same dreary 
technological frenzy’.113 He sees in both the final political expression of the metaphysics 
of modernity carrying the telos of modern enlightenment in the shape of a universalism, a 
planetary state that subjugates the particular national Dasein. Heidegger’s initial support 
for NS arose from the hope that it would awaken the spiritual force to protect the 
authentic Dasein of Germany and Europe against the homogenising imperial forces of 
America and Russia.114 At the end, Heidegger fears, stands a ‘bloodless universalism’115 
that perceives the world as a resource or ‘standing-reserve’,116 present-at-hand to be 
exploited and mastered by humanity,117 an end of national historicity and the death of 
authentic national Dasein.118 The world is understood as a resource to be exploited with 
modern technology, whose essence Heidegger calls Gestell. Through Gestell, the 
cultivation and revelation (aletheia) of the world happens through a purely technological 
and thus rational appreciation of the world that neglects traditional, spiritual forms119 and 
hollows out the authentic Dasein of the Volk. The result is a nihilistic Seinsvergessenheit, 
the forgetting of historical being of peoples, and a ‘debased technocratic globalism’.120 In 
the face of this existential threat, Heidegger hopes the Volk will realise its being-towards-
death, become aware of its non-relational difference and be carefully assertive about its 
future Dasein.121 
Under Nazi rule this conviction makes Heidegger turn away from Nazism. For 
him, NS racism, technological fanaticism and striving for world domination came to 
represent the same modern Seinsvergessenheit that he saw at work in America and 
Russia.122 The only answer, for Heidegger, is a return to authentic Dasein of a 
meaningful community of people able to decide its fate out of its historical being.  
In sum, central to Heidegger’s philosophy is that both conceptually and 
semantically, it aims to establish a philosophy of being based on everyday life and terms, 
and as such it is still meaningful today. Conceptually, history is the core principle of 
Heidegger’s collective national Dasein. Heidegger develops a form of spiritual 
nationalism that goes beyond a conventional chauvinistic nationalism driven by power 
and belief in supremacy, elevating the Volk to a metaphysical entity.123 By grounding a 
new beginning in the Dasein of the German people, he aims to set the first stone to 
overcome the nihilism of modernity124 and to protect the European peoples from the 
American and Asian/Russian threat by overcoming their ‘own uprootedness’.125 
3. Heidegger in New Right intellectualism 
The preceding section outlined how Heidegger defines Dasein at the individual and 
collective level as well as the anti-modernist and anti-liberal dimension in Heidegger’s 
thought. The following section turns to the contemporary GNR and its appropriation of 
Heidegger. Not pretending to be an exhaustive review of the GNR use of Heidegger, it 
aims to provide examples of in-depth discussion of Heidegger, but also the use of 
Heideggerian ‘sound bites’ indicating a common political language and common 
understanding of Heidegger. I will focus first on the intellectual hubs of GNR thought in 
Schnellroda, Dresden and Berlin before turning to examples of Heideggerianism in the 
AfD.  
Schnellroda 
In the Staatspolitisches Handbuch on GNR ‘Masterminds’, published by the Schnellroda-
based IfS, Heidegger is presented as having a ‘direct … influence on the intellectual 
Right’ as his ideas are ‘providing arguments in the metapolitical debate’.126 The IfS is not 
a think tank in the classical sense as it is not ‘policy-producing’ but rather ‘culture-
producing’, aimed at the German ‘cultural Dasein’.127 The idea of a particular German 
Dasein is also a regular subject of articles in the monthly IfS journal Sezession and other 
publications by the IfS or the GNR in general. Most authors and leading figures in the IfS 
have a background in philosophy, history or cultural studies, some with direct links to 
Heidegger or professors such as Ernst Nolte, who himself was a student of Heidegger. 
This also holds true for the authors of the Sezession’s Heidegger issue. Published in 
February 2015128 when PEGIDA reached its climax, the spectrum of authors reaches 
from historian Ernst Nolte (internationally known for his work on fascism)129 to the 
leader of the Identitarian Movement, Martin Sellner. The journal mirrors the actual 
diversity of GNR intellectuals and reflects how the GNR’s ‘innovating ideologists’ think 
about Heidegger and his philosophy. The different contributions focus on Heidegger and 
the way he is useful for ‘the camp of the right’, as Sellner puts it.130  
In the introduction to the Sezession Heidegger issue,131 Kubitschek begins with a 
Heideggerian interpretation of LEGIDA (Leipzig variant of PEGIDA). Looking back at a 
speech he gave in front of protesters,132 he hopes that his words were able to put across 
the ‘meaningful history of our people … in whose heritage we stand’. Referring to 
history, he tried to ‘include the whole Volk in our caring’ (emphasis added). A common 
historical Dasein is presented as the common basis for a collective being, even with those 
who are assumed opponents of the GNR. In his eyes, the protesters symbolise the 
existence of the German Volk by expressing their ‘care’ about the German future. They 
represent a part of the Volk that ‘still knows about itself’, is aware of German Dasein and 
embodies it through its presence on the street. 
Kubitschek frames the German Volk in the Heideggerian terms of history, care 
and Dasein—a conceptualisation inclusive only to all those who share German historical 
heritage. For Kubitschek, a ‘meaningful [German] history’ mobilises the people as the 
‘German Volk’ who expresses its caring about its Dasein through protest in a time when 
the German Volk is ‘first and foremost a form that is hollowed out, forced into the 
Gestell’.133 With Heidegger, the Dasein of the people is defined in historical terms. The 
care about this Dasein expresses itself in the fear of a national death in the face of 
Gestell, globalisation and Islamisation.134 In Heidegger’s terms: by caring about the 
possibility of the nation’s non-relational death, the people becomes aware of itself as a 
collective agent in history.  
Even if this short introduction represents anything but an in-depth analysis of 
Heidegger’s philosophy, it shows how his vernacular notions are used by Kubitschek to 
make sense of and legitimise the protests on the street. The accuracy of the application of 
Heidegger to LEGIDA is of secondary importance, as the aim, the legitimisation of an 
exclusive nationalist movement and its alternative illicit political language through a 
great philosopher, is what is central here. Basing his nationalism on the morally 
acceptable, but through its dependence on historical legacy still exclusive principle of 
national history, Kubitschek attempts to legitimise illicit forms of nationalism. He argues 
that a belief in a common historical mission leads to the belief in a common fate 
necessary to resist transnational homogenisation and the meaningless Gestell. In the 
rational reading of being that he, and Heidegger, see at work in modernity, history has no 
place, as its meaningfulness is lost in a purely economic conception of the world.135  
In another article in the same issue, Martin Sellner, philosophy student, leader of 
the Identitarian Movement,136 describes his ‘path of thinking to Heidegger’.137 He sees 
Heidegger as ‘essential for a real understanding of our time and the mission of our camp’, 
a ‘spiritual King’ whose concept of Dasein is the ‘only, true and last enemy’ of the 
‘project of the planetary human state’, ‘imperialistic rationality’ and ‘totalitarian 
enlightenment’.138 Heidegger is a mastermind because his revolutionary thinking was not 
only directed against the ‘old bourgeois-metaphysical intellectualism’ but also against the 
racist biologism and anti-Semitism of Nazism: 
It [Heidegger’s philosophy] questions all modes of nationalism … and fascism as 
well as all conservative, religious or traditionalist ideas. … The nationalist 
brotherhood wars, the biologic misconceptions of the ethnos, the fascist excess of 
statehood, the Führer cult, the megalomania, the ecstatic political religions … and 
last but not least the enterprise … to eliminate the alienation with modernity through 
the extermination of the biological Jew as modernity’s ‘demon’—all this appears … 
as the expression of the forgetting and the oppression of the questions of being and 
truth which naturally leads to a ‘loss of centre’, and to a spiritual and political 
extremism.139  
As this quote shows, the seemingly post-racial and anti-NS aspect of 
Heideggerian philosophy is used to legitimise GNR nationalism against claims of racism 
or closeness to NS. It even opens itself up to leftist anti-capitalism as, according to 
Sellner, Heidegger’s insistence on Dasein is the only way to resist a planetary capitalism 
destroying ‘authentic Dasein’. Modern progress eradicates these ‘different questionings 
and revelations of being’ through its ‘ever more progressive exploitation and exploration 
of being’.140 
With Heidegger, Sellner summons the threat of a universal global state as a 
technocratic Gestell leading to the end of history and the particular historical Dasein of 
peoples. He celebrates the diversity of cultures only to use Heidegger to argue that this 
cultural diversity is under threat. As he states, ‘Dasein is, in its questioning for its mode 
and being always rooted in a concrete ethnocultural soil … a community and a world of 
language’.141 Sellner advocates asking ‘the Heideggerian question of … Dasein’ that 
‘calls for a new fathoming of Heimat, Volk, Nation and Europe’ and for the re-funding of 
nationalism in a seinsgeschichtlich (being-historical) way that deconstructs the Gestell of 
‘the postmodern “End of History”’.142 
The aim is to (re)legitimise the currently questionable idea of an exclusive 
nationalism by wrapping it in Heideggerian terminology of history and linking it to the 
GNR concept of ethnopluralism of a co-existence of ethno-culturally homogeneous but 
globally diverse peoples.143 As an innovating ideologist, Sellner uses the ‘prevailing 
vocabulary’ of liberalism (such as ‘diversity’ or ‘pluralism’)144 to change the established 
political language from within. He shows ‘that in spite of contrary appearances a number 
of favourable terms can be applied as apt descriptions of [one’s] own apparently 
questionable behaviour’.145 
One can object to such a reading as wrong or contradictory, especially because 
Heidegger would have refused any emphasis of ethnic properties. Moreover, Heidegger 
did not see all cultures as equal, but rather he saw Germany as the privileged expression 
of Dasein that was to save Europe from its spiritual decline. However, the essence both 
of ethnopluralism and Heidegger’s philosophy forms the conviction that the particular 
Dasein is threatened by planetary Gestell. As Sellner argues in a different article for 
Sezession, Heidegger’s thinking is a ‘gatekeeper against the imperialistic reason and the 
totalitarian enlightenment’ that threatens the ‘authenticity’ of things, humans, people and 
cultures.146  
Another central GNR author is Martin Lichtmesz. He has been influential through 
contributions to Sezession but also through a number of books published with Antaios. 
Can Only a God Save Us? is one of these books. Its title refers directly to Heidegger’s 
claim uttered in the famous 1966 Spiegel interview.147 Lichtmesz dedicated a whole 
chapter to Heidegger,148 focusing on his late philosophy and specifically his framing of 
modernity as culminating in an era where ‘science and technology’ have ‘replaced God’ 
and been given ‘God-like status’.149 For Lichtmesz, this belief has become planetary, 
total and quasi-sacral, leading to ‘disenchantment’ and ‘the vanishing of the mysterious, 
the mythical, the miraculous, the sacral, the numinous—all those irrational sources’ that 
nurture life.150 These sources, however, are necessary in order to limit a ‘moral of the 
feasible’ and a belief that ‘everything functions’.151 Appreciating human being through a 
purely technological appreciation of the world would make humanity live in a Gestell, the 
uprooting of human life based on a meaningless shaping of the planet through 
technology. More than that, the idea of the Gestell, Lichtmesz suggests, represents a 
domination of human Dasein through a technology that has developed its own force. This 
would eventually lead to catastrophes such as Auschwitz and the nuclear bomb as 
symbols for a planetary nihilism. According to Lichtmesz, ‘all essential and great has 
only developed out of the fact that the human being had a Heimat and was rooted in 
tradition’.152 
Dresden 
More widespread than the in-depth-discussion of Heidegger’s philosophy is the use of 
Heideggerian notions and ‘sound bites’ to read contemporary developments. For 
example, in a short piece in Tumult on the 2017 German elections, Lorenz Jäger, 
sociologist, journalist and former representative of the Frankfurt School, quotes 
Heidegger’s alleged last handwritten words: ‘What is needed is a reflection if and how in 
the era of a technological homogenous world civilisation a homeland can exist.’ 
According to Jäger, the idea of such an era represents the ‘madness that today enjoys 
highest recognition’ by the mainstream.153 This reading of Heidegger points to a view of 
the world undermining Dasein similar to Lichtmesz and Sellner.  
Another case for the application of Heideggerian thought to contemporary politics 
is a Tumult review154 of the exhibition ‘The Invention of Human Races’ in the Dresden 
Hygiene Museum.155 As the reviewer states, by suggesting that races are constructs, the 
exhibition postulates an ultimate universal truth and a horizontal homogenisation of 
humanity into equal races, ignoring the plurality of truth and the reality of difference 
between regions and countries. The exhibition implies that ‘any form of thinking human 
Dasein like Heidegger … as asserting and unfolding itself in a vertical way’ through 
different kinds of being human is illicit. Like the IfS’s use of Heidegger, the predominant 
idea of Dasein as universal human is seen to undermine the ethnopluralist diversity of 
human being. Pluralism as a positive term of the liberal democratic political language is 
here charged with an alternative meaning, applying it to a diversity of ethnicities and 
races that would be threatened by neoliberal globalisation and liberal universalism. 
Berlin 
Alongside the more activist IfS, the BdK has developed into a bourgeois platform 
bringing together widely accepted German politicians and political scientists, such as 
CDU member Wolfgang Bosbach156 and Werner Patzelt,157 AfD representatives and 
GNR intellectuals. In 2017, the Finnish literary scholar Tarmo Kunnas presented his book 
Fascination of an Illusion: European Intelligentsia and the Fascist Temptation 1919–
1945158 on the main European figures of the CR.159 His presentation focused on 
Heidegger and the connection of his notion of politics and Dasein. According to Kunnas, 
Heidegger sees the Greek polis as the ‘basis for being human’: ‘The idea of the polis is 
the “there” of Dasein’, the ‘historical site out of which Dasein is feeding itself’. This 
rootedness in a polis and ‘direct access to being … is the only way authenticity could be 
reached’. For Kunnas, Heidegger provides an important definition of politics not 
restricted to parties and the state but, as a ‘great politics’, including culture. He states that 
Heidegger was part of a whole range of conservative intellectuals who hoped that the 
convergence of the people, politics and ‘artistic politics’ would help to lead to a European 
renaissance and resistance to the ‘decline of the European culture in materialism and 
plutocracy’. The nation as a part of great politics is here seen as a sort of spiritual 
platform bringing together elites and the people. Even if Kunnas presents the CR as a 
phenomenon of the past, the discussion following his presentation makes clear that his 
presentation is used as a tool to analyse the present. Most comments point to a perceived 
current decline of Europe and mention that looking back at the CR and Heidegger would 
be a useful way to face the ‘contemporary cultural crisis’. How broad the range of far-
right politics is in the BdK, as well as its international network, is shown by the fact that 
Kunnas has presented the same book to the fascist Casa Pound in Italy.160 
Discussions of this sort are mainly limited to GNR intellectual circles but can be 
used more widely as a political language to legitimise or ‘decontest’161 exclusive 
nationalism.162 The examples above show that intellectuals engage both intensively and 
sporadically with Heidegger’s thought. They draw on his philosophy as one source to 
frame their worldview and define what a nation and a Volk is. For GNR innovating 
ideologists, Heideggerianism is attractive through its rejection of liberalism and its 
spiritual-historical understanding of the nation. But how much does Heidegger’s thought 
play a role in the AfD? 
 4. Heidegger, populism and the AfD 
As seen above, Heidegger’s philosophy is one central resource arguing for a renewed 
German nationalism. GNR innovating ideologists draw on it to develop an alternative 
political language as a basis for a legitimate sense of national self-assertion. This political 
language can be used to frame and legitimise the political actions of leading members of 
the far-right populist AfD. Referring to Heidegger, who still is widely regarded as one of 
the greatest philosophers of the 20th century, may appeal to intellectual audiences who 
themselves are dissatisfied with contemporary politics. Elite support is a declared goal of 
the NR and seen as necessary and even more important than reaching mass support in 
order to bring about substantial social change through metapolitics.163  
Referring to Heidegger can also impress a broader, more popular audience. This 
might be the intention of the articles on the far-right populist magazine Compact, where 
Heidegger’s terms are used to justify calls for more national sovereignty to ‘overcome the 
currently widespread idea of historylessness (Geschichtslosigkeit)’ and rule of technology 
in the shape of a global ‘digital totalitarianism’.164 In a Compact interview with French 
NR mastermind Alain de Benoist, Heidegger’s terms are used to portray globalisation as 
a spread of ‘individualism, the religion of human rights, the pre-eminence of self-
interests, the regression of all values for the profit of the market society and thus the 
permanent spread of the capitalist Gestell’.165 
However, the focus of this last section will be on the use of this political language 
in the populist far-right AfD and figures linking the GNR, the AfD and social 
movements. Michael Klonovsky is a good example of the entanglement of GNR 
intellectualism and AfD populism. His popular blog Acta Diurna is a central reference in 
GNR circles. He was advisor to Frauke Petry, former leader of the AfD, and is the 
present assistant of Alexander Gauland, who has led the party together with Jörg 
Meuthen since 2017. On his blog, Klonovsky calls Heidegger’s Being and Time ‘one of 
my favorite books’ before he quotes his favourite review of Being and Time by a reader 
on Amazon. Here Heidegger’s work is seen as a masterpiece pushing the limits of human 
intelligence.166 In another blog post he quotes Heidegger disciple Ernst Nolte with the 
hope that ‘our descendants don’t fully dissolve in what … Heidegger has called the 
Worldcivilisation’167 Although this use of Heidegger’s terms remains superficial, the 
explicit reference to him is nevertheless a means of legitimisation, a sign of cultivation. It 
equally shows that Heidegger’s work has had an impact on central figures at the 
intersection of GNR intellectualism and AfD populism and that Heideggerianism is a 
common reference point of the GNR’s alternative political language. 
But even at the AfD level, a deeper engagement with Heidegger can be observed. 
One of the most direct links between the GNR and the AfD leadership is Marc Jongen, 
former assistant to the German philosopher Peter Sloterdijk and now MP and AfD 
speaker in the state of Baden-Würtemberg. Jongen has himself presented a paper on 
‘Migration and Thymos-Training’ in the IfS168and was guest at the BdK.169 Initially seen 
as the AfD’s party philosopher, his importance in the GNR and the AfD has been 
increasingly marginalised by the actors outlined above. Nevertheless, Jongen is another 
example of the import of Heideggerianism into the AfD’s political language.  
Jongen’s philosophy is strongly influenced by Heidegger. His PhD is centred 
around the question of how to ‘reattribute exigent meaning to the notion of tradition, 
without falling behind the epochal lections of modernity?’170 Following Heidegger and 
the CR, Jongen aims for a spiritual renewal in a meaningless present in order to overcome 
‘the modern phantasm of linear progress’.171 Relying on Heidegger’s notion of aletheia, 
he calls for an end to this time of ‘oblivion of being’ by uncovering the truth of history 
and thus a past meaningful for the present and future.172 Like Heidegger, he claims that 
the reason for this oblivion is modern metaphysics, and it can only be overcome through 
a post-metaphysical interpretation of being. He is convinced that with an oblivion of the 
truth of history, tradition and ‘the origin … there cannot be a future, or only a 
catastrophic future’.173 To avoid such a catastrophe, a spiritual return to the origins is 
needed. 
Jongen is an interesting case because as a philosopher and leading AfD member 
he is, as he says, active in two worlds: the academic-philosophical and the political.174 
His interviews provide insight into how he translates his philosophical Heideggerianism 
into a political one. Here he calls for a spiritual renewal in the face of an Islamist threat 
through thymos—the emotional ‘anger’ necessary to overcome the logo-centric system of 
the established parties. While he concedes that summoning emotions and appealing to the 
spiritual in politics is a dangerous game, he says it’s a risk worth taking ‘if one wants to 
face the big existential menace of the perishing of the German culture’.175 To do so, a 
Heideggerian recovery of traditions would be necessary to invoke pride and anger against 
those who threaten them. He argues that even if they are social constructions, traditions 
are ‘necessary illusions’ to protect the ‘cultural-religious superstructure’ of the society. In 
this way, Germany would return to an authentic being based on a recognition and 
celebration of Germany’s identity. Instead of being afraid of this, he says that ‘the danger 
today is not so much that we will freeze our identity and commit to an aggressive 
nationalism, but rather that we lose what is proper to us’.176 Through his focus on the 
traditions and emotions of the Volk he oscillates between intellectualism and populism. 
By decontesting anger he clearly legitimates the anger visible in such populist 
movements as PEGIDA.  
Last but not least, let us turn to one of the most prominent nationalist and populist 
politicians, Björn Höcke, AfD leader in Thuringia. Supported by national AfD leader 
Alexander Gauland, he is a close friend of Kubitschek, acts in close coordination with the 
IfS and regularly speaks at PEGIDA.177 An eloquent orator, Höcke puts the question of 
German nationhood at the centre of his speeches and calls for the (re)invention of 
traditions through the (re)discovering of ‘authentic history’. Promoting the Kyffhäuser 
meeting organised as a ‘new tradition’ every year by the nationalist AfD section Der 
Flügel, Höcke implicitly refers to Heidegger: ‘I think we founded a great tradition [the 
Kyffhäuser meeting] that is forward-looking. … We … as a Volk need a spiritual return 
to our great history, our great culture, to shape the future and to win back the future’.178 
At the AfD’s 2015 national congress in Hanover, Höcke openly refers to Heidegger: ‘As 
Germans we have to ask who we are. We need a “Yes” to the “Us”.’ The German people 
has to step out of its ‘forgetfulness of being (Seinsvergessenheit)’ and return to its ‘order 
of being (Seinsordnung)’. ‘Yes’, he concludes, ‘this is Heidegger’.179 This might 
represent a simplistic and distorted reading of Heidegger,180 but it nevertheless shows 
Heidegger’s appeal to leading AfD politicians and the impact his words, even if used as 
‘sound bites’, can have on a larger audience, specifically as part of an alternative political 
language. 
Besides this more superficial use of Heidegger in speeches, Höcke talks in detail 
about his view on Heidegger in the recently published book Nie zweimal in denselben 
Fluss. The book represents an attempt to introduce Höcke, ‘the populist’, to a more 
intellectual leadership. In the introduction, Frank Böckelmann, core figure of the Dresden 
GNR and editor of Tumult, praises Höcke, specifically for his notion of the Volk: ‘Here 
we hear not a culprit who is pilloried and is looking for excuses, but an intellectual, who 
has confidently thought through the notion of the “Volk”—a rarity in the political 
debate’.181  
Höcke says that he ‘stumbled upon’ Heidegger’s Being and Time as a young student182 
and found his ‘deeply felt anti-materialism confirmed. No viable ideas concerning order 
can be derived from materialistic ideologies, merely technocratic constructs… held 
together laboriously at the beginning of the 21st century only through bread, games, 
manipulation and ... repression’.183 In the face of this ‘national oblivion of being … our 
Volk loses its soul’ and a positive posture towards itself.184 Alluding to Heidegger’s 
critique of the modern separation of subject and object and the conception of the world as 
Gestell, he calls for an understanding of Heimat not as ‘some abstract environment 
standing in opposite to Man (dem Menschen gegenüber) but concretely the forests, 
meadows, fields, animals and plants of our homeland’.185 Höcke defines Volk as ‘a unity 
of descent, language, culture and commonly experienced society. It is a human form of 
community … not as close as a local tribe and not as distant as an abstract humanity’.186 
This would lend it a complexity that ‘universalist cosmopolitanism’ cannot cope with.  
With Heidegger, Höcke aims to subvert the established political language that 
associates populism with simplicity and complexity with realpolitik. He concedes that the 
notion of the Volk is a construction, but claims that this critique would be ‘banal’, as all 
human reality is a construction. Undermining the notion of the Volk, however, would be 
part of a dangerous trend in ‘late modernity’ in which it has become fashionable to ‘to 
deconstruct what has developed and grown’.187 By not accepting this complexity and the 
spiritual depth of the being of the Volk, ‘universalists’ are the true racists as they deny the 
existence of people and propagate the utopia of a pure humanity ‘empty of people (ohne 
völkisches)’.188 In reality, the ‘melting pot’ argued for by liberals and multiculturalists 
would be a ‘salad bowl’ depriving the different peoples of their Dasein and destroying 
their diversity.189 Equally, his geopolitical analysis mirrors Heidegger’s. Just as 
Heidegger sees the Dasein of the German Volk threatened by America and Russia, Höcke 
sees contemporary Europe in the pincers of neoliberal capitalism and Islam.190  
The examples of Compact, Höcke, Klonovsky and Jongen demonstrate that the 
strong structural and ideological connection to the GNR allows AfD politicians to draw 
on a common political language elaborated by GNR intellectuals. The vocabulary 
legitimises illicit forms of exclusive nationalism and nationalist political practice without 
employing an openly racist discourse. Furthermore, it shows that Heideggerian notions 
can be included in political speeches to mobilise support, be it among a more intellectual, 
well-educated electorate or a broader, more ‘populist audience’.  
5. Conclusion 
This article has explored how GNR intellectuals draw on Heidegger’s philosophy as 
‘innovating ideologists’ to legitimise the ‘questionable behaviour’ of exclusive 
nationalism though the elaboration of an alternative political language. Central in this 
process is their embeddedness in a GNR civil society network that is a carrier and source 
of this language. Heidegger’s philosophy is attractive to the GNR and the AfD for several 
reasons. First, Heidegger’s vernacularism makes his terminology broadly applicable. 
Even if his philosophy is complex, the accessibility and meaningfulness of his core 
concepts makes them intelligible to intellectuals, politicians and broader audiences alike, 
even and especially when used as sound bites. Second, Heidegger’s critique of NS 
reflects the GNR’s self-understanding as a post-racist nationalism focused on the 
preservation of the historical Dasein of all peoples instead of a national world 
domination. Drawing on Heidegger’s personal distancing from Nazism, NS is turned into 
the ‘old right’—yet another expression of rationalist modernity destroying meaningful 
Dasein. Third, Heidegger’s critique of modernity reflects a common narrative in German 
philosophical thought reaching back to such philosophers as Herder. Fourth, Heidegger’s 
personal idealisation of ‘the common folk’ and his aim to bridge the gap between elites 
and Volk chimes with the GNR’s aim to ‘decontest’ populism as well as the notion of the 
Volk. Finally, at a more general level, the central role of philosophy and such institutions 
as the IfS and the BdK reflects the importance of intellectuals in orienting, shaping and 
transforming the debates in the German public sphere in times of crisis191 in favour of the 
populist radical right. 
Even if the GNR’s use of Heidegger is a ‘rhetorical trick’192 to legitimise GNR 
nationalism, it would be short-sighted to portray this move as merely strategic. The 
examples presented here show that Heidegger is a recurring figure in GNR thought. GNR 
intellectuals engage with his philosophy and use it as a resource for their political 
language. His philosophy can be used to defend GNR ethnopluralism and, in embedding 
it into a liberal political language, modifies the established political language from 
within.  
While it is true that through its vernacular terms, Heidegger’s concepts are a 
convenient object for the projection of conservative to far-right ideology, the examples 
show that the GNR’s worldview has much in common with Heidegger’s ideas. Even 
when used as sound bites, Heideggerian terms have come to signify membership of a 
‘far-right club’. Drawing on Heidegger helps GNR nationalists to solidify their belief in 
what they see as their historical national mission. The reinterpretation of nationalism as a 
necessary fight against the ‘forgetfulness of being’ of technocratic capitalist globalisation 
provides the different actors of the GNR with a common raison d’être. It defies the 
conventional view of the far-right as a form of anti-intellectual populism whose reference 
to moral principles should be seen as a dubious practice, and allows the GNR to gain 
credibility among well-educated and even leftist audiences who see globalisation as a 
menace to local identities. Hence, focusing on the German far-right as a purely populist 
phenomenon neglects the role of GNR intellectualism and reflects a vision of politics 
where moral principles play no role. To follow such a vision risks ignoring the processes 
of legitimisation described above and thus underestimating the GNR’s capacity to bring 
about social change. 
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